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49 
COURT OR ARBITRATOR—WHO DECIDES 
WHETHER RES JUDICATA BARS SUBSEQUENT 
ARBITRATION UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT? 
Jarrod Wong∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time, courts blanched at the idea of 
arbitration.  Perfectly respectable people would opt to settle 
their disputes by arbitration only to find that the courts 
would not enforce agreements to arbitrate, never mind 
arbitral awards.1  Jealous of their role and function, courts 
justified their hostility on the ground that arbitration 
agreements improperly “ousted [the courts] from their 
jurisdiction.”2  However, the world of arbitration and the way 
it is perceived by courts have undergone a revolution.  
Arbitration now rivals, if it has not already displaced, court 
adjudication as the preferred means of resolving civil 
disputes.3  Part of this phenomenon has to do with a general 
acknowledgment of the inherent advantages of arbitration 
over litigation, including its ease of procedure, greater speed 
and privacy, and its drawing on expert knowledge in the 
 
∗ J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1999; LL.M., University 
of Chicago, 1996; B.A. (Hons) (Law), Cambridge University, 1995.  I am grateful 
to Greg Richardson for his helpful comments.  All opinions and errors remain 
my own. 
 1. See generally STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER, 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-11 (1998) (discussing the historical roots 
of American arbitration, including traditional resistance to and eventual 
acceptance of arbitration by courts). 
 2. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 
(2d Cir. 1942) (citation omitted). 
 3. G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of 
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1988) (“Arbitration is 
rapidly overtaking court adjudication as the most popular forum for the trial of 
civil disputes.”). 
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adjudication of the dispute.4  Another significant part of this 
phenomenon has been the fostering of legislative and judicial 
policies favoring arbitration.5  In particular, the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 19256 renders enforceable any written 
agreement to arbitrate an existing or future dispute, allowing 
for the judicial review of any resulting arbitral award only on 
the most narrow of grounds.7  In other words, arbitration is 
today prized for its differences from court adjudication—
differences that have effectively been endorsed by the 
legislature and by the parties themselves. 
As with so many post-modern stories, however, this one 
doesn’t end happily ever after.  Despite Congress’s 
endorsement of arbitration in passing the Federal Arbitration 
Act, courts still prevent parties from fully realizing the 
benefits of arbitration by issuing ill-reasoned rulings on the 
subject of res judicata in the context of arbitration.8  
Specifically, where there has been a prior decision by a court 
or arbitrator that relates to the matter at issue in a 
subsequent arbitration, courts are unable to answer in a 
principled way the fundamental question of who—court or 
arbitrator—gets to decide whether the prior decision bars the 
subsequent arbitration by virtue of the doctrine of res 
judicata.  The problem is that legislative policies embodied in 
the Federal Arbitration Act are frustrated when federal 
courts improperly determine that they, and not arbitrators, 
should decide the issue.  As a result, the courts impose a 
judicial resolution process that the parties did not bargain 
for.  This increased and unnecessary judicial intervention 
effectively denies parties their freedom to contract, as well as 
 
 4. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“[A]rbitration most often arises in areas where courts are at a significant 
experiential disadvantage and arbitrators, who understand the ‘language and 
workings of the shop,’ may best serve the interest of the parties.” (citations 
omitted)); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 133 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (“The advantages of arbitration are well-known.  Arbitration is 
‘usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and 
evidentiary rules . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 5. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 
1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration . . . .”). 
 6. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000). 
 7. Indeed, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 was passed to counter the 
then-existing judicial bias against arbitration.  See infra Part III. 
 8. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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the benefits of arbitration to which they are entitled.9 
Thus, in order to provide parties assurance that the 
arbitration clauses in their contracts will be respected, and to 
avoid the associated and unexpected costs of litigation, the 
issue of who determines the res judicata effect of a prior 
decision in subsequent arbitration should be resolved 
definitively.  Yet courts have reached divergent conclusions 
on this issue.10  Some courts have held that they should 
decide the issue,11 while others have maintained that the 
arbitrators should determine whether res judicata applies.12  
Careful consideration of the cases, however, reveals that 
these two viewpoints can be reconciled.  The key to such 
reconciliation is determining whether the prior decision is an 
earlier judgment of the same court now deciding the res 
judicata question.  If the prior decision was issued by the 
same court, that court should determine whether res judicata 
applies.13  On the other hand, if the prior decision was an 
arbitral award or a judgment issued by a different court, then 
the arbitrator should decide whether that prior decision 
precludes subsequent arbitration.14  In other words, the 
general rule is that res judicata is an issue for arbitrators.15  
The limited exception to this rule applies when the prior 
decision is an earlier judgment of the same court asked to 
decide the res judicata issue.16  Significantly, this rule is not 
only supported by the case law, but is also justified by 
fundamental principles governing arbitration. 
 
 9. See Prod. & Maintenance Employees’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 
916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“Arbitration clauses are 
agreements to move cases out of court, to simplify dispute resolution, making it 
quick and cheap. . . . Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends: 
a suit to compel or prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and a suit to 
enforce or set aside the award.  Arbitration then becomes more costly than 
litigation, for if the parties had elected to litigate their disputes they would have 
had to visit court only once.  Reluctance to see the benefits of arbitration 
smothered by the costs and delay of litigation explains the tendency of courts to 
order a party feebly opposing arbitration (or its outcome) to pay the winner’s 
legal fees.  Anything less makes a mockery of arbitration’s promise to expedite 
and cut the costs of resolving disputes.” (citations omitted)). 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 13. See discussion infra Part V. 
 14. See discussion infra Part V. 
 15. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 16. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
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Arbitration is, above all, a matter of contract.17  This 
means that no party can be forced to arbitrate an issue unless 
it has entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement.  By 
the same token, where parties have agreed to arbitrate an 
issue, they should be held to that agreement, and any dispute 
arising in relation thereto should be resolved by arbitration, 
not through the courts.  As explained below, the defense of res 
judicata, like any other affirmative defense,18 is part of the 
merits of the dispute and should be resolved accordingly.19  
Therefore, when parties agree to arbitrate an issue, they 
necessarily agree to arbitrate any affirmative defense relating 
thereto, including that of res judicata, unless they specifically 
provide otherwise.  In the absence of any legal or equitable 
grounds for revoking these contracts, courts must respect 
such arbitration agreements by enforcing them under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, thereby allowing arbitrators to 
determine the res judicata effect of prior decisions.20 
However, where the prior decision is a judgment issued 
by the court that is being asked to compel arbitration, a 
different result is called for.  In this instance, the ability of 
the court to protect the integrity and the effectiveness of its 
own judgments is uniquely at stake.  Having issued the 
decision in question, the court is best qualified to assess its 
scope and effects, including the extent to which it bears on 
the question of the preclusion of subsequent arbitration.  
Under these exceptional circumstances, the court rather than 
the arbitrator should be called upon to consider any 
preclusion issues arising from the prior judgment. 
In sum, the general rule is that arbitrators should 
determine the res judicata effect of prior decisions on 
subsequent arbitration, except when the prior decision is the 
court’s own judgment.  Where the earlier decision is that of 
the same court, the court should decide the res judicata issue.  
This article is structured as follows.  Part II briefly reviews 
the concept of res judicata and its general application in the 
context of arbitration.  Part III examines the Federal 
Arbitration Act and the context in which preclusion issues 
 
 17. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 18. Examples of affirmative defenses to a claim include laches and the 
statute of limitations.  See infra text accompanying note 138. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90, 103, 138. 
 20. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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affecting subsequent arbitration arise before federal courts.  
Part IV discusses some of the relevant decisions regarding 
who should determine whether res judicata bars subsequent 
arbitration, and notes the apparent divergence of authorities.  
Part V reconciles the cases to disprove the idea that any true 
divergence exists, and explains the proposed rule.  Part VI 
examines Supreme Court decisions on the more general 
question of who should decide whether any particular dispute 
is arbitrable, and analyzes their relevance to the proposed 
rule.  Finally, Part VII, while noting the general applicability 
of the proposed rule, examines and clarifies particular 
situations in which its application is more complex. 
II. RES JUDICATA 
The doctrine of res judicata refers to the binding effect of 
a judgment in a prior case on the claims or issues in 
subsequent litigation.21 Conceptually, the doctrine has two 
primary applications, sometimes referred to as true res 
judicata, or claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion.22  True res judicata prevents a party from suing 
on a claim or cause of action that has or could have been 
determined by a competent court in a final and binding 
judgment.23  Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of 
specific issues actually litigated and determined by a final 
judgment, where the issues were essential to the judgment.24  
This article is primarily concerned with true res judicata, and 
any reference herein to res judicata is to true res judicata, 
unless otherwise indicated.25 
 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1336-37 (8th ed. 2004). 
 22. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 
n.1 (1984) (explaining that res judicata “consist[s] of two preclusion concepts: 
‘issue preclusion’ and ‘claim preclusion’”). 
 23. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
131.10[1][a] (3d ed. 2000) (“Claim preclusion prevents a party from suing on a 
claim which has been previously litigated to a final judgment by that party or 
such party’s privies and precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal 
theory, cause of action, or defense which could have been asserted in that 
action.”). 
 24. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 77 n.1; 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 
23, § 131.10[1][a] (“Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues actually 
litigated and necessary for the outcome of the prior suit, even if the current 
action involves different claims.”). 
 25. It is important to keep the two applications separate because, as we 
shall see, the answer to the question concerning who should determine the 
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There are several policy considerations underpinning the 
doctrine of res judicata.  First, the nature of courts requires 
that their judgments be treated as final and authoritative; 
courts do not sit to render “advisory opinions.”26  Second, the 
parties are entitled to repose.27 Third, both the public and the 
parties should be protected against the costs associated with 
duplicative litigation.28  Finally, the integrity of the judicial 
system is threatened by the prospect of inconsistent and 
conflicting outcomes.29  In sum, the doctrine of res judicata 
serves to secure finality in judicial proceedings and to 
promote the efficient administration of justice.30 
It is well-settled that the doctrine of res judicata and its 
underlying policies apply in equal measure to arbitral 
awards.31  The Second Restatement of Judgments provides 
that “a valid and final award by arbitration has the same 
effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same 
exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.”32  
Indeed, as one commentator has noted, “courts have long held 
that res judicata applies to arbitration awards.”33  This 
statement is logical, given the strong legislative and judicial 
policies favoring arbitration.  After all, arbitration cannot be 
a fully effective alternative to litigation if parties who have 
elected to arbitrate a dispute are permitted to litigate matters 
determined in a prior arbitration.  If anything, the doctrine of 
res judicata should be applied even more assiduously in the 
 
preclusive effects of a prior decision may vary depending on whether true res 
judicata or collateral estoppel is involved.  See infra Part VII.C. 
 26. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS 14 (2001). 
 27. See id. at 16. 
 28. See id. at 16-17. 
 29. See id. at 18. 
 30. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(1) (1982) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]; see also Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 711, 724 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004) (“As a general matter, an arbitration award is the equivalent of a 
final judgment which renders all factual and legal matters in the award res 
judicata.” (citation omitted)); Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters., 48 F.3d 
576, 585 (1st Cir. 1995) (“An arbitration award generally has res judicata effect 
as to all claims heard by the arbitrators.” (citations omitted)); Simpson v. 
Westchester, 773 N.Y.S.2d 881, 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that “the 
doctrine of res judicata applies to arbitration awards”). 
 32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 84(1). 
 33. Shell, supra note 3, at 641 (citing N.Y. Lumber & Wood-Working v. 
Schnieder, 119 N.Y. 475 (1890); Brazill v. Isham, 12 N.Y. 9 (1854)). 
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context of arbitration, since the intent underlying both 
concepts is to avoid unnecessary litigation.34  It would be 
ironic to find that purpose thwarted at precisely the point 
where the two coincide.  Indeed, a failure to apply res judicata 
to arbitral awards would deviate from the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “Act” or 
“Arbitration Act”).35 
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
In enacting the Arbitration Act, Congress sought to 
“reverse[] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements” by “plac[ing] arbitration agreements ‘upon the 
same footing as other contracts.’”36  The Act accomplishes this 
purpose by providing in § 2, the operative core of the 
Arbitration Act, that: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.37 
Thus, all arbitration agreements involving transactions 
that affect interstate and international commerce are subject 
to the Arbitration Act,38 which requires their enforcement 
except under limited circumstances.39  In more general terms, 
the Arbitration Act federalizes arbitration law and “creates a 
 
 34. Cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co. Inc., 781 F.2d 494, 497 
n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]rbitration is ordinarily preferable to litigation, but to 
allow arbitration on top of the protracted litigation in this case would be to add 
insult to injury.  The doctrine of res judicata . . . [has] probably done more to 
prevent useless and wasteful litigation than arbitration ever could.”). 
 35. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 36. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 68-96 at 2 (1924)). 
 37. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 38. Section 1 of the Act defines “commerce,” in part, as “commerce among 
the several States or with foreign nations.”  Id. § 1. 
 39. Id. (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce.”). 
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body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating 
the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.”40 
The Arbitration Act permits district court involvement in 
the arbitration process in two primary ways.41  The first 
arises prior to arbitration when a party resists arbitration 
under an existing arbitration clause.42  In such a case, the Act 
allows a district court to compel or enjoin arbitration as the 
circumstances may dictate.43  The second arises after 
arbitration when enforcement of an arbitral award is 
sought.44  There, the statute authorizes the district court to 
confirm, vacate, or modify the award under a narrow scope of 
judicial review.45 
Beyond these two circumscribed functions, the Act does 
not authorize court involvement in enforcing arbitration.  
Indeed, courts are “to exercise the utmost restraint and to 
tread gingerly before intruding upon the arbitral process.”46  
The reason for this restrained approach is that “[a]rbitration 
is, above all, a matter of contract and courts must respect the 
parties’ bargained-for method of dispute resolution.”47  The 
idea behind the Act is that arbitration “is a matter of consent, 
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”48  However, where the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, the Act requires 
that they be held to their agreement.49  As the Supreme Court 
has noted, the “passage of the Act was motivated, first and 
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into 
which parties had entered.”50  The net effect is that the Act 
 
 40. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 
n.32 (1983). 
 41. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing Local 103 of the Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v. 
RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2000); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 
507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 44. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 136. 
 45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11. 
 46. Lewis v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 407 F.2d 1185, 
1191 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 47. Olick, 151 F.3d at 136-37 (citing Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. 
Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 48. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
 49. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 50. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1984) (footnote 
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strongly favors a policy of respecting agreements to arbitrate, 
and courts must avoid intruding upon arbitration proceedings 
in the absence of explicit statutory authorization. 
Accordingly, when a party raises the defense of res 
judicata in resisting arbitration, the court’s task under the 
Act is limited to determining whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate the particular dispute, and ordering the parties to 
proceed to arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement” when such agreement is found.51  More 
specifically, in order to compel arbitration, the district court 
must first affirmatively answer the following questions: (1) 
whether the parties seeking or resisting arbitration have a 
valid arbitration agreement; and (2) whether the particular 
dispute between those parties—in this case, the question of 
res judicata—falls within the contours of the arbitration 
agreement.52  These two issues determine the “arbitrability” 
of the dispute.53  In any event, it is plain that both questions, 
however defined, must be proved and answered in the 
affirmative before the court may compel arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act.  Where these questions are answered in the 
affirmative, the court’s duty under the Arbitration Act, absent 
any “grounds that exist at law or [in] equity for the revocation 
of any contract,”54 is to compel arbitration and allow the 
 
omitted). 
 51. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 52. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 137 (noting that under the Arbitration Act, both 
questions were “threshold questions [that] a district court must answer before 
compelling or enjoining arbitration”); see also PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 
921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that courts need only “engage in a 
limited review to ensure that the dispute is arbitrable—i.e., that a valid 
agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and that the specific dispute 
falls within the substantive scope of that agreement”). 
 53. Olick, 151 F.3d at 137.  Some authorities refer to “arbitrability” only in 
terms of either Question (1) or (2).  See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 944-45 (referring only to Question (1) as involving 
“arbitrability”); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., ARBITRATION 107 (1996) (referring only 
to Question (2) as a matter of “arbitrability”).  Arguably, however, the question 
of “arbitrability” necessarily encompasses both questions since both questions 
are distinct and must be answered before one can conclude that a dispute is in 
fact arbitrable.  See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 
129, 135 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ‘arbitrability’ of a dispute comprises the questions 
of (1) whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate at all under the 
contract in question . . . and if so, (2) whether the particular dispute sought to 
be arbitrated falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”).  This article 
therefore employs the term “arbitrability” to include both questions. 
 54. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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arbitrator to adjudicate the substantive dispute from that 
point forward.  On the other hand, if the court finds that the 
issue is not arbitrable, then the court gets to decide the res 
judicata question. 
While this two-part process represents the proper 
framework in which to analyze arbitrability under the 
Arbitration Act, courts have not always been systematic in 
approaching this inquiry.  Courts do not always explain the 
statutory context in which the claims arise or ground their 
reasoning in the structure of the Act.55  For example, some 
courts have simply focused on the question of whether the 
court or the arbitrator is the more appropriate 
decisionmaker.56  Although this question has relevance to the 
broader inquiry, it is only part of that inquiry.57 The 
sometimes haphazard manner in which the courts have 
approached this problem has only contributed to the 
appearance of an incoherent case law in which the federal 
courts are stubbornly split on the question of who should 
determine the issue of res judicata. 
IV. THE APPARENT DIVERGENCE OF AUTHORITIES 
In addressing the question of whether courts or 
arbitrators should decide the res judicata issue, the federal 
courts have reached seemingly disparate and conflicting 
conclusions.  Some courts of appeals have held that the 
preclusive effect of a prior decision on subsequent arbitration 
is to be decided by a court,58 while others have ruled that it 
should be decided by an arbitrator.59  Yet other courts of 
 
 55. See, e.g., In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 382-83 (8th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a court should determine the res judicata question by 
focusing on a court’s power to defend its judgment but without specifically 
relating it to the Arbitration Act). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 383 (holding that the court should decide the res judicata 
issue where the prior decision at issue was a judgment of the court because 
“[t]he district court, and not the arbitration panel, is the best interpreter of its 
own judgment”). 
 57. See infra Part V. 
 58. See, e.g., In re Y & A, 38 F.3d at 383; Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1068 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 1011 (1993). 
 59. See, e.g., Consol. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12, 
Local Union 1545, 213 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he question of the 
preclusive force of the first arbitration is, like any other defense, itself an issue 
for a subsequent arbitrator to decide.”); Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 
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appeals have determined that it should be decided by both 
courts and arbitrators.60 
A. Cases Holding that the Court Should Determine the Res 
Judicata Issue 
Two notable cases holding that the court should 
determine the res judicata issue are Kelly v. Merrill Lynch61 
and In re Y & A Securities Litigation.62 
In Kelly, plaintiff customers initially brought a suit in 
federal court against Merrill Lynch alleging violations of 
federal securities laws.  An agreement between the parties 
provided that “[e]xcept to the extent that controversies 
involving claims arising under the federal securities laws may 
be litigated, any controversy between [the parties] . . . shall 
be settled by arbitration.”63  After the district court granted 
summary judgment to Merrill Lynch on those claims, 
plaintiffs initiated arbitration of several state common-law 
claims.  Merrill Lynch considered these state claims to be 
based on the same conduct underlying the earlier litigation,64 
and responded by filing a motion for a preliminary injunction 
against the arbitration, which the court granted.65 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that 
res judicata barred arbitration because the plaintiffs could 
have, but did not, bring their state law claims in the earlier 
litigation.66  In doing so, the court determined that the district 
court, rather than the arbitrator, should determine the res 
judicata effect of prior litigation.67  Noting the Act’s policy 
favoring arbitration, the court stated that “the general rule 
for deciding which questions belong to the courts is that, 
 
Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); Indep. Lift Truck Builders Union v. NACCO 
Materials Handling Group, Inc., 202 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
preclusive effect of an arbitrator’s decision is an issue for a subsequent 
arbitrator to decide.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 
129 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 60. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 138-40 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 61. Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993). 
 62. In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 63. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1068 n.1. 
 64. Id. at 1068. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1070. 
 67. Id. at 1069. 
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while federal courts can decide if an issue is arbitrable or not, 
they cannot reach the merits of arbitrable issues.”68  
Notwithstanding this rule, however, the court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that the issue of res judicata, as an 
affirmative defense that went to the merits of the claims, 
should be left to arbitration.69  The court held instead that 
courts could decide res judicata, as the issue was “not just one 
of preventing the piecemeal litigation that occurs when 
parties simultaneously assert claims in several forums, but of 
protecting prior judgments.”70 
Similarly, in In re Y & A Group Securities Litigation,71 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s decision to enjoin arbitration on the grounds that it 
was precluded by a prior consent judgment.72  In In re Y & A, 
the arbitration panel had previously considered, but rejected, 
the argument that arbitration was precluded.73  This means 
that the court of appeals determined not only that a district 
court should determine the res judicata issue, but that it 
could also override an arbitrator’s decision on that issue.  
Rejecting the appellant’s argument that the district court was 
not permitted to reconsider the arbitration panel’s decision, 
the court of appeals noted that the panel’s decision was 
ultimately based on its interpretation of the settlement 
agreement incorporated in the district court’s final 
judgment.74  Therefore, it was “[t]he district court, and not the 
arbitration panel, [who was] the best interpreter of its own 
judgment,” and who had the final say in the matter.75 
While Kelly and In re Y & A stand for the proposition 
that courts should determine the res judicata issue, as set 
forth in the following section, other cases have concluded that 
the arbitrator, and not the court, should determine the res 
judicata effect of a prior decision. 
 
 68. Id. (citations omitted). 
 69. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069. 
 70. Id. 
 71. In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 72. Id. at 381. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 383. 
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B. Cases Holding that the Arbitrator Should Determine the 
Res Judicata Issue 
More recently, some courts have held instead that the 
arbitrator should decide the res judicata issue.  Two notable 
cases are National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Belco 
Petroleum Corp.76 and Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic 
Systems, Inc.77 
National Union was one of the first federal appellate 
decisions to depart from precedent by determining that the 
arbitrator should decide the res judicata issue, thereby 
creating an apparent divergence of authority.78  In that case, 
the insured, (“Belco”), had been awarded $144.9 million 
(ninety percent of its $161 million loss) plus interest in a prior 
arbitration against the insurers (“National Union”) for certain 
oil exploration and development operations seized by the 
Peruvian government.79  These seized interests were covered 
under a confiscation, expropriation, and deprivation 
insurance policy issued by National Union.80  The following 
year, Belco separately recovered $2.925 million under a 
maritime insurance policy with an expropriation endorsement 
issued by a different insurer, Seahawk International 
Associates, Inc., covering certain vessels that had also been 
taken by Peru.81  Subsequently, National Union served Belco 
with a demand for arbitration under the expropriation policy, 
seeking to recoup a portion of the $2.925 million proceeds on 
the ground that National Union’s expropriation policy 
required any recoveries for loss outside the policy to be shared 
between the insurers.82  Belco responded by seeking a 
declaratory judgment in federal court that National Union’s 
claim was barred by res judicata.83  National Union 
subsequently filed a petition to compel arbitration.84  The 
district court held that the arbitrator should decide the res 
 
 76. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 77. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 78. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 136. 
 79. Id. at 131. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 132. 
 84. Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 132. 
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judicata issue, and accordingly granted National Union’s 
petition to compel arbitration.85 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s order compelling arbitration.86  Critical to the decision 
was the fact that the arbitration clause was broadly rendered 
to include “[a]ll disputes which may arise under or in 
connection with [the expropriation] policy”87 and that under 
the Arbitration Act, “any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”88  
Belco’s claim of preclusion was no more than a legal defense 
to National Union’s claim, and as such, was “itself a 
component of the dispute on the merits,”89 being “as much 
related to the merits as such affirmative defenses as a time 
limit in the arbitration agreement or laches, which are 
assigned to an arbitrator under a broad arbitration clause 
similar to the one in the [expropriation policy].”90 
Like the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth 
Circuit, in Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc.,91 
held that the res judicata effect of a prior arbitral award on a 
subsequent arbitration should be decided by an arbitrator 
rather than the court.92  In Chiron, the plaintiff biotechnology 
company entered into a joint business arrangement with the 
defendant company.93  The agreement memorializing the joint 
undertaking provided for the arbitration of any disputes 
arising thereunder.94  When a dispute arose between the 
parties, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in 
federal court seeking an order compelling arbitration of the 
dispute.95  In response, the defendant moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that a prior arbitral award issued in 
favor of the defendant operated as res judicata to all claims 
the plaintiff sought to raise in a second arbitration 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 136. 
 87. Id. at 132. 
 88. Id. at 135. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 136 (citations omitted). 
 91. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 92. See id. at 1132. 
 93. Id. at 1128. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1129. 
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proceeding.96  The district court concluded, however, that the 
res judicata defense was itself an arbitrable issue within the 
scope of the parties’ agreement, and therefore granted the 
plaintiff’s request for an order compelling a second 
arbitration.97  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court.98 
Notably, while the defendant acknowledged that the 
dispute itself was subject to arbitration, it argued that a 
defense of res judicata should be treated differently from the 
merits of the dispute.99  The defendant’s argument was 
premised on the notion that the court would make a better 
decision than an arbitrator or that it was unfair to leave the 
issue to an arbitrator.100  Rejecting these arguments, the court 
of appeals instead affirmed the contractual nature of 
arbitration, noting that the defendant had already elected to 
arbitrate all disputes under the parties’ agreement.101  The 
court further noted that the detailed procedures for alternate 
dispute resolution as negotiated by the parties demonstrated 
that the defendant’s election to arbitrate was deliberate.102  
Citing National Union with approval, the court observed that 
the res judicata defense, like any other affirmative defense, 
was part of the merits of the dispute that was plainly 
arbitrable under the unambiguously broad arbitration clause 
in the agreement between the parties.103  Therefore, the court 
held that the arbitrator should decide the issue of res 
judicata. 
C. Cases Holding that Both the Court and the Arbitrator 
Should Determine the Res Judicata Issue 
In addition, a third category of cases has held that both 
the court and the arbitrator should decide the res judicata 
issue.  In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Olick,104 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1129. 
 98. Id. at 1134. 
 99. Id. at 1132. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id.  The parties’ agreement provided that the parties were to submit 
to arbitration “any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to” the 
agreement.  Id. at 1128. 
 102. See id. at 1132. 
 103. See Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1132, 1134. 
 104. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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the Third Circuit addressed the preclusive effects of both a 
prior court judgment and a prior arbitral award on 
subsequent arbitration, and held that the court should decide 
the former, whereas the arbitrator should resolve the latter.  
In that case, an employee (Olick) had filed a Statement of 
Claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”) against his employer, John Hancock, seeking the 
arbitration of certain tort claims.105  In response, the 
employer sought a declaration in federal court that Olick’s 
claims before the NASD were barred by res judicata as a 
result of two prior decisions.106  One of the decisions was an 
arbitral award issued a year earlier by NASD in favor of 
Olick in an arbitration between the parties relating to certain 
limited partnership transactions.107  The other decision was a 
district court judgment denying an action brought by third 
parties against both Olick and the employer and in which 
Olick had cross-claimed against the employer.108 
The district court denied the employer’s request for the 
declaration on the grounds that the arbitrator, rather than 
the court, should determine res judicata issues under the 
Arbitration Act.109  The employer then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the court also denied.110  In so doing, 
the district court expressly declined to apply case law cited by 
the employer for the proposition that courts, and not 
arbitrators, determine res judicata issues stemming from a 
prior judgment rendered by a federal court.111  The court 
noted that the cited case law was distinguishable from the 
“hybrid” situation before it, which involved “both a prior 
arbitration and a prior federal court decision.”112  On appeal, 
the Third Circuit rejected such a distinction as simplistic and 
unhelpful.113  Instead, it proceeded to analyze separately the 
res judicata effect arising from the prior judgment, and 
 
 105. See id. at 134. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Olick, 151 F.3d at 134. 
 111. See id.  These cases include In re Y & A Group Securities Litigation, 38 
F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994), and Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993), both of 
which were discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 112. Olick, 151 F.3d at 134. 
 113. Id. at 138-39. 
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arbitral award, respectively.114 
With respect to the judgment, the Third Circuit observed 
that “many federal courts have held as a matter of law that 
claims of res judicata based on a prior federal judgment must 
be decided by the district court before compelling or enjoining 
arbitration,”115 although it also noted that not all courts had 
reached the same conclusion.116  Significantly, however, this 
position was adopted in an earlier Third Circuit decision,  
Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey v. New Jersey Bell 
Telephone Co.,117 which the lower court in Olick had declined 
to apply because of the “hybrid” situation.118  Ultimately, the 
court of appeals followed its own precedent and resolved the 
issue in favor of district court jurisdiction to decide the effect 
of the res judicata defense, and thereby reversed the district 
court’s decision on that issue.119  Regarding the arbitral 
award, however, the court of appeals reached the opposite 
conclusion, holding that the district court had correctly 
determined that the arbitrator should decide its res judicata 
effect.120 
The court explained this difference in result by referring 
to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  Under 
that agreement, the parties were to submit any dispute 
arising out of the business of any NASD member to 
arbitration, and any resulting arbitral awards were to be 
“final and not subject to review or appeal.”121  The agreement 
further provided that the arbitrators were empowered to 
interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions of 
the relevant arbitration procedure.122  Since the question of 
res judicata goes to the nature and extent of the  finality of 
the award, which the parties had agreed was a matter for 
arbitrators, it was for the arbitrator and not the court to 
 
 114. Id. at 139 (“When a party resisting arbitration bases its claim of res 
judicata not only on a prior judgment but also on the existence of a prior 
arbitration, the analysis must focus on each aspect of the claim; hybrid facts do 
not call for a hybrid analysis.”). 
 115. Id. at 137 (citations omitted). 
 116. See id. at 137-38. 
 117. Tel. Workers Union of N.J. v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
 118. Olick, 151 F.3d at 138-39. 
 119. See id. at 139. 
 120. Id. at 140. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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determine the preclusive effect of the prior arbitration 
award.123  In sum, the court of appeals held that the district 
court should determine the res judicata effect of its judgment, 
whereas the arbitrator should decide the res judicata effect of 
an arbitral award. 
D. Summing Up the Three Categories of Cases 
As set forth above, courts are seemingly divided on the 
question of who decides the merits of a res judicata defense.  
The answer appears to vary depending on whether the court 
chooses to emphasize the contractual nature of arbitration, in 
which case arbitrators will determine the res judicata issue, 
or to focus instead on the need to protect the integrity of the 
prior decision, in which case the court gets to decide the issue.  
As explained below, however, both concerns are valid and 
have their place within the framework of the Arbitration Act.  
The key to making sense of this discrepancy is to recognize 
that a different concern properly predominates depending on 
the nature of the prior decision.  Where the prior decision is a 
judgment issued by the same court being asked to compel 
arbitration, the court’s need to protect its own judgments 
overrides any agreement by the parties to submit the res 
judicta issue to arbitration.  Where the prior decision is an 
arbitral award or a judgment issued by a different court, the 
court cannot be said to be protecting its own judgments, and 
the parties’ agreement to refer the res judicata issue to 
arbitration thereby assumes priority. 
V. THE GENERAL RULE, ITS LIMITED EXCEPTION, AND THEIR 
RATIONALES 
The following rule reconciles the divergent holdings 
regarding whether the court or arbitrator determines the res 
judicata effect of a prior decision: An arbitrator should decide 
the res judicata effect of prior decisions on subsequent 
arbitration, except when the prior decision at issue is the 
court’s own judgment.  Only when the prior decision is the 
court’s own judgment should the court determine the res 
judicata issue. 
Analysis of the cases discussed in Part IV illustrates and 
confirms this rule.  In cases that determined that an 
 
 123. Id. 
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arbitrator should decide the res judicata defense—National 
Union and Chiron—the decision-maker considered the 
preclusive effects of a prior arbitral award.  By contrast, in 
cases that concluded that a court should decide the res 
judicata issue—Kelly and In re Y & A—the decision-maker 
was concerned with the preclusive effects of prior judgments 
that were issued by the same courts being asked to compel 
arbitration.124  Olick, however, provides the clearest 
illustration of this distinction because it held that the district 
court’s prior judgment and the arbitral award should be 
determined by the district court and the arbitrator 
respectively.125  Indeed, many of the federal appellate courts 
that have dealt with this issue have reached a result that 
comports with the Olick distinction, even if the underlying 
rationale is not clearly articulated.126 
The proper analysis in determining whether the court or 
arbitrator should decide the issue of res judicata begins with 
two questions: (1) Did the parties enter into a valid 
agreement to arbitrate?, and (2) Is the res judicata defense 
within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate?127  If the 
answer to both questions is “yes,” then the court must enforce 
the arbitration agreement and permit the arbitrator to 
determine the res judicata issue.  Otherwise, the court 
decides the issue.128 
A. The Analytical Framework 
1. QUESTION 1: Did the Parties Enter Into a Valid 
Agreement to Arbitrate? 
Question 1 focuses on the validity or enforceability of the 
agreement to arbitrate.  This inquiry must consider whether 
the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate or whether their 
consent to arbitration was otherwise valid.129  The focus of 
 
 124. See supra Part IV. 
 125. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 139-40. 
 126. See supra Part IV. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 
135 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the subject of Question (1) was whether “there 
[was] a valid arbitration agreement between the parties at all” and citing the 
example that “[t]he arbitrability issue in First Options was whether certain 
individuals were bound by an agreement that they did not sign” (citations 
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this question is whether there is a binding agreement to 
arbitrate “some” issues, regardless of what those issues might 
be.130  In raising the defense of res judicata, the party 
resisting arbitration does not challenge the fact that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute.131  On the contrary, 
a party relying on res judicata contends that arbitration 
based on an otherwise valid arbitration agreement is 
precluded by the existence of a prior relevant decision.  In 
other words, the reliance on res judicata rests on the 
assumption that the parties had validly entered into such an 
agreement.132  Therefore, the defense of res judicata does not 
in itself implicate a Question 1 inquiry, and assuming there is 
no separate dispute that an otherwise valid arbitration 
agreement exists,133 Question 1 must be answered in the 
affirmative. 
It is apparent that in each of the cases cited in Part IV, 
the parties agreed to arbitrate “some” issues, including the 
subject matter of the underlying dispute.  Instead, the parties 
disagreed as to whether the existence of a prior decision 
precluded an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.  For 
instance, in National Union, although the insured argued 
that the insurer was barred from seeking a second arbitration 
under the expropriation policy between the parties, there was 
no question that the policy contained an otherwise valid 
arbitration clause.134  Similarly, in Kelly, while Merrill Lynch 
 
omitted)). 
 130. Id. (finding that Question (1) was resolved since “there [was] no question 
that the [contract between the parties] contains a valid agreement, binding on 
[appellant], to arbitrate ‘some issues’”). 
 131. See, e.g., id. (rejecting appellant’s “characterization of the preclusion 
issue . . . as part of the ‘arbitrability’ of the dispute” and noting that the 
“preclusion issue is not, in the words of First Options, a disagreement over 
‘whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate the merits’ of their dispute” (quoting 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995))). 
 132. It would not matter what preclusive effect a prior decision has on 
subsequent arbitration if such arbitration was never agreed to in the first place. 
 133. A party who resists arbitration by relying on a defense of res judicata 
may, of course, in the alternative also dispute that it entered into a valid 
arbitration agreement (for example, by alleging that it did not sign the 
agreement), in which case, the court will have to examine the facts relevant to 
that dispute to determine Question 1.  The point here, however, is that the 
reliance on the defense of res judicata itself does not place in contention the 
issues that are the subject of Question 1. 
 134. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135 (“[T]here [was] no question that the AIG 
policy contains a valid agreement, binding on [the insured], to arbitrate ‘some 
issues.’”). 
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contended that the plaintiff customers were precluded from 
seeking arbitration for state law claims as a result of a court 
judgment arising from prior litigation between the parties, 
there was no dispute that the parties had agreed to arbitrate 
any state law claims arising from the contract between 
them.135  Thus, Question 1 is answered in the affirmative 
when posed to the cases in Part IV. 
2. QUESTION 2: Is the Res Judicata Defense Within the 
Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate? 
In asking whether the res judicata defense is within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, Question 2 focuses on the 
particular terms of the agreement.  Therefore, Question 2 is a 
matter of contract interpretation.  If the agreement 
specifically includes (or excludes) the res judicata defense as a 
matter for arbitration, the court will have little difficulty in 
resolving this question.  However, most arbitration clauses, 
including those discussed in Part IV, do not expressly refer to 
res judicata.  Instead, they typically provide for the 
arbitration of all disputes “arising out of”136 or “relating to”137 
the parties’ agreement.  The question then becomes whether 
such broad language should encompass any res judicata 
defense as a matter of general contract law. 
The defense of res judicata, like any other affirmative 
defense to the substantive claim, is simply part of the merits 
of the underlying substantive dispute.138  As part of the 
 
 135. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 
1068 n.1 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993) (“Each plaintiff had 
previously signed a written agreement that . . . any controversy between us 
arising out of . . . this agreement shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 136. See, e.g., id.; see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 
132, 140 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The parties’ arbitration agreement . . . submits to the 
NASD ‘any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between [the parties] 
that is required to be arbitrated under the rules of [NASD].’”). 
 137. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 
1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[The parties] agreed to arbitrate ‘any dispute, controversy 
or claim arising out of or relating to’ the [agreement].”). 
 138. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135-36 (“[A] claim of preclusion is a legal 
defense to [the substantive] claim.  As such, it is itself a component of the 
dispute on the merits. . . . It is as much related to the merits as such affirmative 
defenses as a time limit in the arbitration agreement or laches.”).  That res 
judicata is properly characterized as an affirmative defense under federal law is 
evidenced by Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires 
parties affirmatively to plead a res judicata defense, as well as various other 
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merits, the res judicata issue should be resolved along with, 
and in the same manner as, the substantive dispute.  
Therefore, assuming the court finds that the merits of the 
dispute fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, it 
should also conclude that the defense of res judicata falls 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  This scenario 
was present in the cases discussed in Part IV.  As noted above 
with regard to Question 1, while the parties in those cases 
disagreed over who should determine the preclusive effect of a 
prior decision, there was no doubt that they had agreed to 
arbitrate the subject matter of the underlying dispute.139  It 
follows, therefore, that the defense of res judicata falls within 
the scope of the arbitration agreements in those cases as part 
of the merits of the dispute. 
Thus, when parties agree to arbitrate a claim under a 
broad arbitration clause, they are deemed to have agreed to 
arbitrate any defenses relating thereto, including that of res 
judicata.  Such an inclusive reading is consistent with general 
principles of contract interpretation, as evidenced by the fact 
that other affirmative defenses are similarly considered to be 
included within the scope of a broad arbitration clause.140  
Such a reading also comports with “the strong federal policy 
in favor of arbitration,”141 under which the Supreme Court 
has held that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”142  This 
policy has its roots in the contractual nature of arbitration 
agreements, and is essentially a reaffirmation of the same 
general principles of contract law. 
As noted above, Question 2 is simply a matter of contract 
interpretation.  Where that contract is silent, the task for the 
interpreter is to construct “the hypothetical bargain that the 
parties themselves would have chosen in a completely 
spelled-out agreement . . . or at least, the bargain that that it 
 
defenses, including estoppel, laches, and statute of limitations.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 8(c). 
 139. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135-36 (noting that res judicata is no 
different from other affirmative defenses, which are “a component of the dispute 
on the merits” and “are assigned to an arbitrator under a broad arbitration 
clause [that did not provide specifically for such defenses]”). 
 141. Olick, 151 F.3d at 137. 
 142. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983). 
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would be rational for [most similarly-situated] parties to have 
chosen ex ante.”143 As the Supreme Court has explained, the 
issue of whether the res judicata defense is within the scope 
of the arbitration agreement is not an esoteric matter and 
“parties likely gave at least some thought to [what falls 
within] the scope of arbitration.”144  This being the case, and 
given that the law favors arbitration, the more rational 
interpretation is that parties would assume that the res 
judicata defense is arbitrable and the onus would be on 
parties who did not wish to arbitrate the matter to clearly 
indicate this.145  As such, “issues will be deemed arbitrable 
unless ‘it is clear that the arbitration clause has not included’ 
them.”146  In other words, Question 2 is to be answered in the 
affirmative under these circumstances. 
B. The General Rule 
Once Questions 1 and 2 are answered affirmatively, the 
court in each case must, barring any “grounds that exist at 
law and equity for the revocation of any contract,”147 enforce 
the respective agreements to arbitrate the dispute, including 
the res judicata defense.148  This boils down to the proposition 
that where a court finds the underlying dispute arbitrable, 
the res judicata issue is also arbitrable, and in the absence of 
legal and equitable grounds for revoking a contract, the court 
must enforce the arbitration agreement.  The general rule, 
therefore, is that the arbitrator gets to decide the res judicata 
defense in a dispute governed by a broad arbitration clause, 
provided the underlying dispute falls within the scope of the 
clause. 
 
 143. Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About 
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 34 
(2003).  For my own possibly contrary purposes, I quote a commentator’s 
description of the purpose of “default rules” employed in contract law to divine 
the intent of parties in the absence of direct evidence relating thereto.  See id. 
 144. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). 
 145. See id. (noting that given “the law’s permissive policies in respect of 
arbitration, . . . one can understand why the law would insist on clarity before 
concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter” (citations 
omitted)). 
 146. Id. (quoting 1 G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 
12.01, at 156 (rev. ed. Supp. 1993)). 
 147. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 148. See id. 
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C. The Limited Exception to the General Rule 
The general rule would suggest that the proper result in 
all of the cases discussed in Part IV is that the arbitrator 
should determine the res judicata defense.  However, the 
opposite conclusion was reached in those cases where the 
prior decision was an earlier judgment of the same court.149  
Such cases are distinguishable on the ground that the courts 
deciding them had also authored the respective prior 
decisions whose preclusive effects were at issue.150  Having 
issued the very decisions that are under consideration, those 
courts are naturally more qualified than anyone else, 
including any arbitrator, to determine correctly their 
substance and scope, and therefore, any preclusive effects 
they may have on subsequent arbitration.151  In this situation, 
it makes sense to assume that the parties would instead have 
expected the court—the more qualified candidate for the job—
to determine the res judicata issue. 
In a recent case that involved the application of an 
arbitration rule to determine a dispute’s arbitrability, the 
Supreme Court observed that arbitrators, being 
“comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own 
rule, are comparatively better able to interpret and to apply 
it.”152  As such, the Court concluded that “in the absence of 
any statement to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, it 
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the agreement 
to reflect that understanding.”153  Similarly, following this 
reasoning, where the prior decision at issue is a judgment 
issued by the court, it is “reasonable to infer” that the parties 
intended their agreement to reflect the understanding that 
 
 149. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 150. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 151. See In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The 
district court, and not the arbitration panel, is the best interpreter of its own 
judgment.”). 
 152. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 153. Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 
(1995)).  Cf. Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 428 n.7 (Minn. 
1980) (holding that the court should rule on a laches defense to a request for 
arbitration where the defense was based on activity before that very court 
because it would be “more efficient and practical for the trial judge, who 
presumably is familiar with what has transpired in the litigation, to decide the 
issue of laches than for an arbitrator who has had no connection with the 
litigation”). 
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the court, being “comparatively more expert” about the 
meaning of its “own” judgment, is comparatively better able 
to interpret and to apply it. 
Thus, the general rule that an arbitrator should decide 
the res judicata issue does not apply here because it is not 
reasonable to assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate the 
res judicata defense under these circumstances.  Or, put in 
terms of Question 2, the res judicata issue would not be 
deemed within the scope of a broad arbitration clause when 
the prior decision was a court’s own judgment.  This is 
because the parties would not rationally have assigned the 
dispute’s resolution ex ante to an arbitrator instead of the 
court where the latter was better equipped to do the job.  
Accordingly, the court should determine the res judicata issue 
in that situation. 
Furthermore, this result holds true even if we disregard 
the expertise factor and assume that the parties had agreed 
to arbitrate the res judicata issue.  Because such an 
agreement would circumscribe the court’s ability to protect 
the integrity of its own judgments, it would be unenforceable.  
It is well established that courts are entitled to protect the 
integrity of their judgments.154  Under both common law and 
statutory law,155 federal courts are given broad injunctive 
powers to enforce their judgments and to prevent undue 
interference therewith.156  This power includes the authority 
to prevent repetitive litigation of claims already determined 
by a court’s final judgment since such litigation undermines 
the judgment.157  For the same reasons, federal courts are also 
 
 154. See infra notes 155-56. 
 155. See All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). 
 156. See Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that the 
“long recognized power of courts of equity to effectuate their decrees by 
injunctions or writs of assistance” had been codified in the All Writs Statute, 
which “empowers courts to issue injunctions to protect or effectuate their 
judgments” (citations omitted)); Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 
273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (“It is well settled that the courts of the 
United States have inherent and statutory (28 U.S.C. § 1651) power and 
authority to enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce and effectuate 
their lawful orders and judgments, and to prevent them from being thwarted 
and interfered with . . . .” (citations omitted)); Gregis v. Edberg, 645 F. Supp. 
1153, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 157. See Wesch, 6 F.3d at 1470 (noting that courts are empowered under the 
All Writs Act to issue injunctions in order to “avoid relitigation of questions once 
settled between the same parties”); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. 
Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (“Under 
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empowered to enjoin arbitration to prevent relitigating claims 
that have been, or could have been, resolved by a court’s prior 
final judgment.158  Accordingly, an agreement to arbitrate the 
res judicata defense arising from such a judgment is 
unenforceable as it would deprive the court of its ability to 
protect its own judgment.159  In the context of the Arbitration 
Act, the potential usurpation of the court’s power to protect 
its judgments represents “such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract,” thereby relieving 
the court of the obligation to enforce such an agreement.160  
Where this is the case, the court should proceed to determine 
the res judicata issue.  Thus, regardless of whether there is 
an agreement to arbitrate the res judicata defense with 
respect to a prior decision, a court should rule on that 
defense, rather than permit its arbitration, when the prior 
decision at issue is its own judgment. 
This result also corresponds to, and therefore draws 
support from, that reached by courts in resolving the question 
of who should determine whether a party who has 
participated in litigation has waived its right to arbitration 
because of such participation.  In the case of Reid Burton 
Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters District Council of Southern 
Colorado,161 an employer had filed an action in federal court 
against certain unions alleging the violation of a no-strike 
clause in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.162  The 
 
the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, a federal court has the power to 
enjoin a party before it from attempting to relitigate the same issues in another 
federal court.” (footnote and citations omitted)); Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 
573 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (“It is well established that a court 
has the power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to enjoin the repetitive 
litigation of the same action.” (footnote and citations omitted)). 
 158. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 
1069 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993) (noting that the federal 
courts’ powers under the All Writs Act “include[] the authority to enjoin 
arbitration to prevent re-litigation” (citations omitted)); Sheldon Co. Profit 
Sharing Plan & Trust v. Smith, 858 F. Supp. 663, 667 (W.D. Mich. 1994) 
(“Under the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, . . . a federal court has broad 
injunctive powers to protect its own judgment, including the power to enjoin 
arbitration in the interests of preventing relitigation of claims and issues it has 
already decided.” (citation omitted)). 
 159. See Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069. 
 160. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  For the text of the full provision, see supra text 
accompanying note 37. 
 161. Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 535 
F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1976). 
 162. Id. at 599-600. 
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unions argued in response that the court had no jurisdiction 
over the dispute since the collective bargaining agreement 
ultimately referred any “dispute . . . involving the application 
or interpretation of the terms of th[e] agreement” to 
arbitration.163  They further stated that one of the defendant 
unions, Local 1340, was not even a party to the collective 
bargaining agreement.164  However, a year after the 
complaint was filed, the unions admitted that while they did 
not consider Local 1340 to be a “party” to the collective 
bargaining agreement, they considered it to be “bound by the 
substantive terms of the agreement.”165  In its trial 
memorandum, the employer responded by asserting that such 
dilatory pleading practices before the court estopped the 
unions from claiming any right to arbitration.166 
Confronting this issue at trial, the district court first 
determined whether a judicial proceeding or arbitration was 
the proper forum for deciding the waiver issue.167  The court 
found that because the arbitration clause was broadly 
worded, the issue of waiver, like any other equitable defense, 
was to be determined by the arbitrator.168 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.169  While the 
general rule was that equitable defenses were considered to 
be within the scope of a broadly worded arbitration clause, 
and thus arbitrable, it did not apply in this case because the 
waiver defense at issue involved conduct before the district 
court itself.170  Further, the court found that allowing an 
arbitrator to decide the issue would compromise the court’s 
control of its own proceedings.171 
The court of appeals evaluated the arbitrability of the 
waiver issue by objectively looking to the collective 
bargaining agreement to determine the parties’ intent.172  It 
concluded that while the language of the clause was broad 
 
 163. Id. at 602 (quoting terms of collective bargaining agreement). 
 164. Id. at 600. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 602. 
 167. Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 602. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 604. 
 170. See id. at 603.  The conduct at issue here was the aforementioned 
dilatory pleading tactics before the court. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 603-04. 
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enough to cover the waiver issue, it “d[id] not believe that the 
parties ever intended to include the arbitration of equitable 
defenses arising out of actions before a district court.”173  In 
any event, 
even had the parties so intended, [the court] would 
conclude that such an agreement would clearly exceed the 
proper subject matter of a collective bargaining agreement 
and would not be enforceable in court; it would be 
improper for the prospective parties of a lawsuit to 
attempt by contract to bind the exercise of a court’s 
inherent judicial function.174 
After all, “[c]ourts must, of course, maintain judicial 
control of their own proceedings”175 and “[s]uch power . . . is 
broad enough to include a court’s determination of the 
validity of equitable defenses arising out of the action before 
the court.  To hold otherwise would unnecessarily hamper a 
court’s control of its own proceedings.”176 
Other courts have also held that the validity of an 
equitable defense is to be determined by the court, rather 
than the arbitrator, where the defense curbs the exercise of 
the court’s “judicial function.”  In Brothers Jurewicz, Inc. v. 
Atari, Inc.,177 the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the 
trial court’s determination that it, rather than an arbitrator, 
was to decide whether the plaintiff manufacturer lost its right 
to arbitration under an otherwise valid arbitration agreement 
between the parties because it failed to request arbitration 
until a year after the initiation of litigation before the trial 
court.178  The court held that while the general rule was that 
arbitrators should determine such equitable defenses under a 
broad arbitration clause, there were several reasons to carve 
out a “limited exception which allows courts to rule on a 
laches defense to a request for arbitration in cases where the 
defense is not based on the underlying dispute but instead is 
 
 173. Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 603. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1980). 
 178. Id. at 428.  Although this is a state case decided under Minnesota’s 
Uniform Arbitration Act, and not the Federal Arbitration Act, one would 
approach this issue similarly under both statutes.  See id. at 427 n.5 (noting 
that despite certain differences between the statutes, “the issue here considered 
is presented similarly under both acts”). 
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derived from activity before the very court being urged to 
compel arbitration.”179  For one, “issues such as laches may be 
beyond the scope of even a broadly worded arbitration clause 
since it is unlikely that an arbitration agreement ‘ever 
intended to include the arbitration of equitable defenses 
arising out of actions by a party in proceedings before a [trial] 
court.’”180  The court also observed that it would be “more 
efficient and practical for the trial judge, who presumably is 
familiar with what has transpired in the litigation, to decide 
the issue of laches than for an arbitrator who has had no 
connection with the litigation.”181  Another significant reason 
lies in the fact that “courts must maintain sufficient judicial 
control over their own proceedings to determine the validity 
of equitable defenses that arise out of the actions of parties 
before the court.”182 
Similarly, the question of whether a prior judgment of 
the court precludes subsequent arbitration should not be 
considered within the scope of a broadly worded arbitration 
clause. This is because it is unlikely that the parties would 
have agreed to arbitrate an issue arising from earlier 
proceedings between them before the same court.183  Since 
that court would be familiar with the issue, it would also be 
in the best position to resolve it.184  Even if the parties had 
intended this result, such an agreement would “clearly exceed 
the proper subject matter”185 of an arbitration agreement and 
“would not be enforceable in court; it would be improper for 
the prospective parties of a lawsuit to attempt by contract to 
bind the exercise of a court’s inherent judicial function”186 
insofar as it hampers the ability of the court to protect its own 
judgments.187  Thus, to paraphrase the court in Brothers 
Jurewicz, while the general rule is that arbitrators should 
determine the preclusive effects of prior decisions on 
subsequent arbitration, there should be a limited exception 
allowing courts to rule on a res judicata defense to a request 
 
 179. Id. at 427-28. 
 180. Id. (quoting Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604). 
 181. Id. at 428 n.7. 
 182. Id. at 427. 
 183. See Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604. 
 184. See id. at 603. 
 185. Id. at 604. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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for arbitration in cases where the prior decision is a judgment 
issued by the very court being urged to compel arbitration.188 
The adoption of this rule and its exception  (the “proposed 
rule”), explicates and imposes order on the existing case law, 
including those cases discussed in Part IV.  Indeed, certain 
threads of its supporting rationale, if somewhat tangled, can 
be discerned in those cases.  For example, in In re Y & A, 
where the prior decision at issue was an earlier judgment of 
the district court, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision to enjoin arbitration rather than allow the 
arbitrator to determine the defense, on the ground that it was 
“[t]he district court, and not the arbitration panel, [who was] 
the best interpreter of its own judgment.”189  The court of 
appeals pointed to the fact that “[t]he All Writs Act makes 
plain that each federal court is the sole arbiter of how to 
protect its judgments.”190  In Chiron, where the prior decision 
in question was an arbitral award, the court held that the 
arbitrator was to decide the issue, and distinguished In re Y 
& A and Kelly on the ground that they both “involved the 
court determining the res judicata effect of its own prior 
judgment on a subsequent arbitration proceeding.”191  The 
court also observed that the rationale expressed in those 
cases “rests on the presumption that the court issuing the 
original decision is best equipped to determine what was 
considered and decided in that decision and thus what is or is 
not precluded by that decision.”192  Although the courts did 
not proceed to spell out how these issues bore on any 
arbitration agreement between the parties in the context of 
the Arbitration Act, they properly relied on them to reach the 
correct result. 
VI. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON THE ARBITRABILITY OF 
ARBITRABILITY 
The rule proposed in this article is also consistent with 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in this area of law.  
 
 188. See Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 427-28 (Minn. 
1980); supra text accompanying note 179. 
 189. In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 190. Id. at 382-83. 
 191. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 192. Id. 
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While the Court has yet to address the res judicata issue 
specifically, it has considered arbitrability questions that bear 
on the issue.  In particular, two decisions are relevant to the 
res judicata question.  The first is First Options of Chicago, 
Inc. v. Kaplan,193 in which the Court laid down principles 
governing the question of who should determine the 
arbitrability of a dispute.194  The second decision is Howsam 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,195 in which the Court refined 
those principles, differentiating between substantive and 
procedural questions of arbitrability.196 
A. Cases Bearing on the Res Judicata Issue 
1. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan 
In First Options, the question before the Court was 
whether the district court or the arbitrator should decide 
whether the respondents were bound to arbitrate a dispute 
between the parties under an arbitration agreement that the 
respondents claimed not to have signed.197  In ruling that the 
district court should decide the issue, the Court first 
distinguished between (A) the “arbitrability” of a dispute,198 or 
whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to 
arbitration and, (B) the separate issue of who, court or 
arbitrator, determines “arbitrability.”199  The Court found 
that just as the arbitrability of a dispute depends upon 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, the 
determination of who decides arbitrability “turns upon what 
 
 193. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 194. See id. at 942. 
 195. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 196. See id. at 85. 
 197. First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. 
 198. As discussed above, the “arbitrability” of a dispute comprises the 
question of whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate under the 
contract in question, and if so, whether the particular dispute sought to be 
arbitrated falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  See supra notes 
51-53 and accompanying text.  Note, however, that First Options deals 
specifically with the first kind of arbitrability question (i.e., Question (1)) and 
appears for that reason to define “arbitrability” only in that sense.  It is plain, 
however, that “arbitrability” is a broader concept that also includes the second 
type of arbitrability question (i.e., Question (2)) since a dispute over whether a 
particular matter falls within the scope of the arbitration clause is ultimately a 
dispute over whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate that matter (i.e., the 
“arbitrability” of a dispute).  See supra note 53. 
 199. First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. 
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the parties agreed about that matter.”200  If the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, then the arbitrator should 
get to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable.201  On the 
other hand, if the parties had not agreed to submit the 
arbitrability questions to arbitration, then the court should 
decide the question independently, just as it would any 
question not submitted to arbitration.202  The Court derived 
these conclusions from “the fact that arbitration is simply a 
matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve 
those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties 
have agreed to submit to arbitration.”203 
To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability, the First Options Court applied state law 
principles governing the formation of contracts, just as it 
would in deciding whether a contract existed.204  In First 
Options, those principles required the Court to decide 
whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit 
the arbitrability issue to arbitration.205  Not surprisingly, the 
agreement did not expressly include the matter of the 
arbitrability of any dispute within the scope of its arbitration 
clause.206  Nor, however, did the agreement specifically 
exclude it.207  Thus, the question became one of how “to 
interpret silence or ambiguity on the ‘who should decide 
arbitrability’ point.”208 
Applying standard principles of contractual 
interpretation, the Court ruled that “[c]ourts should not 
assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability 
unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they 
did so.”209  Courts, not arbitrators, should determine the 
arbitrability issue unless, for example, the agreement 
specifically provides otherwise.  Such a presumption applies 
in that situation because the question of who should 
 
 200. Id. at 943. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
 206. See id. at 946. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. at 945. 
 209. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 
643, 649 (1986)). 
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determine arbitrability is a higher-level question that is so 
“arcane” that the parties are unlikely to have considered it 
when drawing up the arbitration agreement.210  Therefore, 
the parties would likely not have expected an arbitrator to 
decide the “who” question.211 
As the Court also pointed out, the presumption applicable 
to the “who” question is exactly opposite to the presumption 
applied when a court is faced with silence or ambiguity on the 
arbitrability question itself, which is “whether a particular 
merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the 
scope of a valid arbitration agreement.”212  The presumption 
in the latter situation is that “any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration,”213 and courts must thereby allow arbitrators to 
determine the issue.214  This is because the latter question 
arises when it is not reasonably disputed that the parties 
have agreed to the arbitration of some issues; the dispute, 
rather, is over the scope of the arbitration clause.215  “In such 
circumstances, the parties likely gave at least some thought 
to the scope of arbitration.”216  As such, the parties likely 
would have expected an arbitrator to decide the question.217 
In sum, under First Options, the approach to answering 
either question is simply to identify the relevant terms of the 
parties’ agreement and then to uphold such agreements 
where they exist.218  In the absence of a “completely spelled-
out agreement,” that task would be to figure out what such a 
“hypothetical” agreement would likely have provided, and to 
enforce it accordingly.219  Thus, because the parties in First 
Options were unlikely to have considered the question of who 
should determine whether the particular dispute was 
arbitrable when they concluded the arbitration agreement, 
the Court applied the presumption that the parties would not 
have expected the matter to go to arbitration and held that 
 
 210. See id. at 945. 
 211. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. 
 212. Id. at 944-45. 
 213. Id. at 945 (citation omitted). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. 
 218. See id. at 943. 
 219. Cf. supra text accompanying note 143. 
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the district court should decide this question.220  This 
conclusion appears to suggest that a court should determine 
the arbitrability of any dispute since, as the Court defined it, 
a “who” question was a higher-level inquiry.221  However, as 
discussed below, the Court went on to clarify in Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.222 that the presumption that a 
court should determine the “who” question applies only to 
substantive, and not procedural, questions of arbitrability.223 
2. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
In Howsam, a securities broker brought suit in federal 
court seeking to enjoin its customer from arbitrating a 
dispute before the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”) on the ground that the customer was time-barred 
under an arbitration rule of NASD for initiating its request 
for arbitration more than six years after the dispute.224  The 
district court dismissed the action, holding that the question 
of whether the arbitration was time-barred was one for the 
arbitrator.225  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed.226  Purporting to follow First Options,227 the court of 
appeals determined that the issue was one for the district 
court because, in its view, “application of the NASD rule 
presented a question of the underlying dispute’s 
‘arbitrability’; and the presumption is that a court, not an 
arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an ‘arbitrability’ question.”228 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the court of 
appeals, concluding that “the applicability of the NASD time 
limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not for 
the judge.”229  The Court explained that not all inquiries into 
questions of arbitrability—what it termed “potentially 
 
 220. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 946-47. 
 221. See id. at 944-45. 
 222. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 223. See infra Part VI.A.2. 
 224. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).  The NASD rule in question provided that 
no dispute “shall be eligible for submission to arbitration . . . where six (6) years 
have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the . . . dispute.”  Id. at 
81 (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration  § 10304 (1984)). 
 225. Id. at 82. 
 226. Id. 
 227. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 228. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted). 
 229. Id. at 85. 
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dispositive gateway question[s]”230—fell under the 
interpretive rule applied in First Options.231  In this respect, 
the Court distinguished between “substantive” questions of 
arbitrability, which fall under the interpretive rule, and 
“procedural” questions of arbitrability, which do not.232 
Substantive questions of arbitrability belong to the group 
of questions that arise 
in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting 
parties would likely have expected a court to have decided 
the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have 
thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do 
so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway 
dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing parties to 
arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to 
arbitrate.233 
Examples of such substantive questions of arbitrability 
include disputes about whether the parties are bound by a 
given arbitration clause,234 and disagreements over whether 
an arbitration clause in a concededly binding controversy 
applies to a particular type of controversy.235  The 
presumption in these cases, in line with the parties’ 
expectations, was that the court should determine the 
questions of arbitrability.236 
In contrast, procedural questions of arbitrability come 
under the group of questions that arise in “other kinds of 
general circumstance[s] where parties would likely expect 
that an arbitrator would decide the gateway matter” and are 
presumptively for the arbitrator to decide.237  Examples of 
such questions include procedural defenses to arbitrability, 
such as waiver or delay.238 
In Howsam, the Court also noted that this distinction 
 
 230. Id. at 83. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 85. 
 233. Id. at 83-84. 
 234. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 235. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) 
(concerning whether a labor-management layoff controversy fell within the 
arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement). 
 236. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83. 
 237. Id. at 84. 
 238. See id.; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (finding a contract dispute between the parties to be 
arbitrable even with the addition of claims of waiver and delay). 
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between “substantive” and “procedural” questions of 
arbitrability finds support in the Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act of 2000 (“RUAA”).239  The RUAA provides that: 
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues of 
substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court to decide and 
issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether 
prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, 
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to 
arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to 
decide.240 
Applying this dichotomous analysis, the Howsam Court 
determined that the applicability of the NASD time limit rule 
more closely resembled a “procedural” question of 
arbitrability and was, therefore, a matter for the arbitrator 
and not the court.241  It found support for this conclusion in 
the fact that 
NASD arbitrators, comparatively more expert about the 
meaning of their own rule, are comparatively better able 
to interpret and to apply it.  In the absence of any 
statement to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, it 
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the 
agreement to reflect that understanding.242 
Under a straightforward reading of Howsam, one need 
only ascertain the nature of the arbitrability question to 
figure out whether a court or an arbitrator should decide it.  
Thus, a court decides substantive questions of arbitrability, 
whereas an arbitrator resolves procedural questions of 
arbitrability. 
B. Applying Howsam’s Procedural/Substantive Divide to the 
Res Judicata Issue 
While the Howsam test is straightforward in concept, its 
application to the res judicata issue is complicated by the fact 
that the defense of res judicta is not monolithic in nature.  
Rather, as explained below, depending on the nature of the 
prior decision, the defense of res judicta is either procedural 
or substantive, at least within the meaning of these terms as 
 
 239. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85. 
 240. Id. at 85 (quoting Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 § 6 cmt. 2, 7 
U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002)). 
 241. Id. at 85-86. 
 242. Id. at 85 (citation omitted). 
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employed in Howsam.243 
The procedural/substantive split is no more than 
shorthand for determining, in the absence of explicit guidance 
in the arbitration agreement, who the parties agreed would 
be the decisionmaker.  This correspondence derives from the 
fact that arbitration is simply “a matter of contract,”244 and 
the question of who should decide any arbitrability question 
ultimately turns on what the parties agreed.245  Accordingly, 
the Court spoke of “procedural” questions as those arising in 
circumstances “where parties would likely expect that an 
arbitrator would decide the gateway matter,”246 whereas it 
described “substantive” questions as those arising in those 
circumstances “where contracting parties would likely have 
expected a court to have decided the gateway matter.”247  In 
other words, this dichotomy is simply a device of contractual 
interpretation designed to minimize, if not avoid, “the risk of 
forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not 
have agreed to arbitrate,” and vice versa.248 
As noted above, in the ordinary situation where res 
judicata operates as a defense to arbitration, it is no different 
from other affirmative defenses, such as waiver or laches.249  
Parties likely expect arbitrators to decide the arbitrability of 
affirmative defenses, including res judicata.  Therefore, under 
Howsam, whether res judicata precludes subsequent 
arbitration is generally a procedural question of 
arbitrability.250  The presumption then is that the arbitrator 
decides the issue.251  This conclusion is consistent with the 
proposed general rule that the res judicata issue is a matter 
 
 243. See infra text accompanying notes 244-54. 
 244. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 
 245. Id.  See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 
(1995) (“Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question ‘who has 
the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed 
about that matter.” (citations omitted)). 
 246. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. 
 247. Id. at 83.  Notably, the Court itself does not label the two relevant 
categories of arbitrability questions as “procedural” and “substantive,” although 
the RUAA, upon which it relies, does.  See supra notes 239-40.  
 248. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39. 
 250. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
 251. Id. at 84. 
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for the arbitrator. 
However, as explained above, where the prior decision at 
issue is a judgment of the court being asked to compel 
arbitration, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties had 
not agreed to arbitrate the res judicata issue, but rather, had 
expected the court to decide it.252  To paraphrase the Court in 
Howsam, this is because the court, being comparatively more 
expert about the meaning of its own judgment, is better able 
to interpret the decision and determine its preclusive 
effects.253  Further, as the Court also noted, “for the law to 
assume an expectation that aligns (1) decisionmaker with (2) 
comparative expertise will help better to secure a fair and 
expeditious resolution of the underlying controversy—a goal 
of arbitration systems and judicial systems alike.”254  As such, 
where the prior decision is the court’s own judgment, the res 
judicata issue is “substantive” in the narrow sense relied on 
in Howsam, meaning that the court should decide the issue. 
Thus, the rule proposed by this article is consistent with 
Supreme Court decisions because it requires a court to 
determine the res judicata effect of its own prior judgments, a 
“substantive” question of arbitrability, and otherwise requires 
an arbitrator to determine the preclusive effects of prior 
decisions, a “procedural” question of arbitrability. 
VII.  APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE PROPOSED RULE 
For the most part, the proposed rule is as simple to apply 
as it is to state: courts decide the preclusive effects of their 
own prior judgments on subsequent arbitration, while 
arbitrators determine the preclusive effects of all other prior 
decisions on subsequent arbitration.  However, there are 
several situations in which the rule’s application is less 
straightforward and warrants closer examination. 
A. Entry of Judgment Upon an Arbitral Award 
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act provides that “[i]f the 
parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the 
court shall be entered upon the [arbitral] award,” the court 
must confirm and enter judgment upon the award upon a 
 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 242. 
 254. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
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timely request from any party to the award.255  Additionally, 
under § 13 of the Act, the resultant judgment has “the same 
force and effect, in all respects, as, and [is] subject to all the 
provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action.”256  The 
question then arises whether such a decision is to be treated, 
for the purposes of the proposed rule, as an arbitral award or 
a judgment. 
This question was examined in Chiron,257 a case 
discussed above.258  Relying on language in the Act,259 the 
party opposing arbitration argued that the court should treat 
a previously confirmed arbitral award as if it were a 
judgment rendered in a judicial proceeding, and thereby 
determine its preclusive effect on subsequent arbitration.260  
Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals found instead 
that a judgment obtained under § 13 of the Arbitration Act 
should be considered an arbitral award for preclusion 
purposes.261  The court observed that the approach advocated 
by the party opposing arbitration only begged the question 
since the Arbitration Act “says nothing about which forum or 
who determines the effect of the judgment.”262  In addition, 
the court noted that while a judgment entered upon a 
confirmed arbitration award has the same force and effect 
under the Arbitration Act as a court judgment for 
enforcement purposes, it was not equivalent to a court 
judgment for all purposes.263  For example, while the 
Arbitration Act requires a court to enter judgment upon a 
confirmed arbitral award absent very limited grounds, a 
judgment upon a decision rendered by the court endorses and 
confirms the merits of that decision.264  Along the same lines, 
a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act, unlike one 
arising from a judicial proceeding, may not be reopened and 
 
 255. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). 
 256. Id. § 13. 
 257. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 258. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103. 
 259. 9 U.S.C. § 13 (“The judgment so entered shall have the same force and 
effect, in all respects, as . . . a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as 
if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.”). 
 260. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1133. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
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challenged under Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or appealed unless the parties’ agreement 
specifically provides otherwise.265  “In sum, a judgment upon 
a confirmed arbitration award is qualitatively different from 
a judgment in a court proceeding, even though the judgment 
is recognized under the [Arbitration Act] for enforcement 
purposes.”266 
In support of its case, the party opposing arbitration in 
Chiron cited cases determining that the court should decide 
the res judicata issue,267 including In re Y & A and Kelly.268  
The Chiron court, however, distinguished these cases as 
involving “the court determining the res judicata effect of its 
own prior judgment on a subsequent arbitration 
proceeding.”269  The court noted that the justification in those 
cases 
rests on the presumption that the court issuing the 
original decision is best equipped to determine what was 
considered and decided in that decision and thus what is 
or is not precluded by that decision.  The policy underlying 
these decisions is not served in this case, however, when 
the district court merely confirmed the decision issued by 
another entity, the arbitrator, and was not uniquely 
qualified to ascertain its scope and preclusive effect.270 
Thus, the Chiron court found that, for preclusion 
purposes, a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act is 
more like an arbitral award than a judgment arising from a 
judicial proceeding.271  For the same reasons, this conclusion 
applies when the issue is analyzed under the proposed rule.  
Because a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act is not 
an independent product of the court, there is no reason to 
assume that the court is comparatively more expert in 
determining its preclusive effect.272  As such, it follows that 
there is no reason to assume that the parties would have 
expected the court to decide the issue.  Furthermore, the All 
Writs Act arguably has no application in this situation, since 
 
 265. See id. at 1133. 
 266. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1133-34. 
 267. Id. at 1133. 
 268. See supra text accompanying Part IV.A for a discussion of these cases. 
 269. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1134 (citations omitted). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. at 1133-34. 
 272. See id. at 1134. 
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it only “empowers federal courts to issue injunctions to 
protect or effectuate their judgments.”273  Therefore, a 
judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act should be treated 
as an arbitral award for the purposes of the proposed rule.  
Accordingly, an arbitrator should determine its res judicata 
effect on subsequent arbitration. 
B. Judgments of Courts Other Than Those Being Asked to 
Compel Arbitration 
The general rule that arbitrators should determine the 
res judicata issue extends not only to the case where the prior 
decision is an arbitral award but also where it is a judgment 
of a court other than that being asked to compel 
arbitration.274  The justification for the latter situation is 
perhaps harder to discern and warrants closer examination. 
As discussed above, the rationale for allowing arbitrators 
to decide the issue under a broad arbitration agreement is 
that it is more reasonable to assume that the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate an affirmative defense such as res 
judicata and is consistent with legislative policies favoring 
arbitration.275  However, when the prior decision is an earlier 
judgment of the court being asked to compel arbitration, this 
assumption is not reasonable; instead, the parties would 
likely have expected the court to decide the res judicata issue 
given that the court, having issued the original decision, is 
best equipped to determine what was considered and decided 
in that decision.276  Because this exceptional circumstance 
does not exist when the prior decision is a judgment from a 
different court and there is as such no reason to regard the 
court as more expert than the arbitrator, the general rule 
continues to apply in that situation. 
For example, if the question before a federal district court 
is whether a prior state court decision precludes arbitration 
because of res judicata, the district court should compel 
arbitration and permit an arbitrator to decide the res judicata 
issue.277  Since the district court was not the author of the 
 
 273. Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).  See also supra text accompanying notes 154-56. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 188. 
 275. See supra Part V.A. 
 276. See supra Part V.C. 
 277. But cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co. Inc., 781 F.2d 494 
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prior state court decision, there is no reason to assume that 
the district court would be any more qualified than the 
arbitrator to determine the preclusive effects of the state 
court decision.  There is accordingly no exceptional 
circumstance displacing the prevailing assumption that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the issue, and the arbitrator 
should be permitted to decide the res judicata effects of the 
state court decision. 
In sum, where the prior decision is a judgment of a court 
other than the court that is asked to compel arbitration, the 
presumption is that the arbitrator, and not the court, decides 
its preclusive effect on subsequent arbitration. 
C. Collateral Estoppel: The Exception to the Exception 
Thus far, this article has focused on true res judicata and 
has not yet examined issues of collateral estoppel.  The reader 
will recall that the two doctrines are distinct in that the 
former operates to bar entire claims or causes of action that 
were, or could have been, brought in a prior proceeding, 
whereas the latter precludes only the relitigation of specific 
issues that have been litigated in a prior proceeding.278  Thus, 
when a party relies on collateral estoppel to preclude 
arbitration, it seeks only to preclude the arbitration of certain 
issues and not the entire claim.  As such, “all that a party is 
seeking is not to bar but merely to constrain the arbitrator”279 
so as to “narrow the issues that the arbitrator may 
consider”280 without necessarily challenging the arbitration of 
the dispute generally. 
Given these circumstances, it is arguable that the 
arbitrator, and not the court, should decide the collateral 
estoppel effects of the prior decision even when that prior 
decision is a judgment of the court being asked to compel 
 
(5th Cir. 1986).  In Miller Brewing Co., the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
party seeking arbitration was barred from doing so in federal court as a result 
of the preclusive effects of a prior state court decision binding both parties.  
Note, however, that the parties did not raise, and the court did not consider, the 
specific issue concerning whether arbitrators, rather than the court, should 
have determined that res judicata issue.  See id. 
 277. Id. at 501. 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
 279. Miler v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). 
 280. Id. 
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arbitration.281  While the assumption remains that the court 
is more qualified than the arbitrator to determine the 
decision’s collateral estoppel effects, it is less clear that the 
parties would have expected the court to decide the collateral 
estoppel issue.  This is because any resolution by the court of 
the prior decision’s collateral estoppel effects would dispose of 
only part of a claim, potentially leaving the rest for a separate 
decisionmaker, i.e., the arbitrator.  It seems unlikely that the 
parties would have agreed to isolate a particular issue that 
constitutes an aspect of the claim for the court to rule on, 
while preserving the rest of the claim for arbitration.  This 
course of action would be inefficient and is incompatible with 
the idea that parties seek out arbitration for its ease and 
speed.282  Similarly, if it makes sense “for the law to assume 
an expectation that aligns (1) [a] decisionmaker with (2) 
comparative expertise”283 where it helps to secure the 
“expeditious resolution of the underlying controversy,”284 then 
such an assumption is at best questionable when the result is 
one of greater inefficiency.285 
Moreover, the court’s need to protect its own judgment, 
which is otherwise an additional justification in favor of the 
court determining arbitrability,286 is more limited in the 
context of collateral estoppel because it affects only issues and 
not entire claims.  As discussed above,287 federal courts are 
granted broad injunctive powers under the All Writs Act in 
order to enforce their judgments and to prevent any undue 
 
 281. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that the arbitrator and not the district court should decide 
whether the insured was collaterally estopped from seeking arbitration against 
the insurer for defense costs for bodily-injury claims in asbestos-related 
litigation when the district court had previously declared that the insurer was 
not liable for defense costs for property-damage claims in the asbestos-related 
litigation). 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 283. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Additionally, given that the arbitrator will only have to consider those 
issues that were in fact decided in determining the prior judgment’s collateral 
estoppel effects (and not make the determination as to what other claims could 
theoretically have been brought, as it might have had to do to decide its res 
judicata effects), see supra text accompanying notes 23-24, any advantage 
stemming from the court’s greater expertise concerning its own judgment is 
further reduced when collateral estoppel, and not res judicata, is involved. 
 286. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 287. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
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interference therewith.288  This power includes the authority 
to prevent repetitive litigation of claims already determined 
by a court’s final judgment since such litigation would 
undermine that judgment.289  In the case of collateral 
estoppel, only particular aspects of a claim decided by the 
prior judgment, as opposed to entire claims, are subject to 
reinterpretation.  Consequently, the chances that the 
integrity of the judgment as a whole will be violated are 
diminished, as is the need to invoke the All Writs Act. 
Thus, in the absence of an arbitration agreement 
providing otherwise, arbitrators rather than courts should 
determine the collateral estoppel effects of a prior decision on 
subsequent arbitration, including cases where the prior 
decision is a judgment of the court being asked to compel 
arbitration.  As such, the exception to the proposed rule does 
not apply in cases involving collateral estoppel.  Instead, the 
singular, unqualified rule in this situation is that the 
arbitrator, and not the court, should determine the collateral 
estoppel effects of all prior decisions. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the accommodations that must be made 
in the situations discussed in the prior section, the rule 
proposed by this article is by and large straightforward in its 
application: arbitrators should determine whether prior 
decisions preclude subsequent arbitration by virtue of the 
doctrine of res judicata, except where the prior decision is a 
judgment issued by the court being asked to compel 
arbitration, in which case, that court should determine the 
issue.  The proposed rule reconciles the various federal 
appellate decisions on the question of who should determine 
whether res judicata precludes subsequent arbitration.  More 
importantly, it provides a coherent framework, derived from 
the contractual nature of arbitration, for analyzing the 
question under the Arbitration Act.  The hope is that the 
proposed rule will be employed by both courts and 
arbitrators, who, in so doing, will give the law in this area 
what it urgently needs—a reasoned uniformity. 
 
 
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58. 
 289. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
